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The social scientific turn in UK financial
accounting research: a philosophical and
sociological analysis
Brian A. Rutherford*
Abstract— The demise of the classical programme of financial accounting research is generally represented as a progressive
development. This paper argues that the academy’s abandonment of classical methods was justified neither by the fruitfulness
of post-classical programmes nor by their incontestable epistemological superiority. Rather, what occurred was a turn to
mainstream social science, reflecting sociological characteristics of the UK financial accounting research community. The
paper concludes with a call for a revival of the classical programme.
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1. Introduction
In the opening words of an introductory text on the
subject, ‘there is nearly universal agreement that
science [that is, natural science] is a progressive
discipline’ (Losee, 2004: 1). Depictions of the
history of financial accounting research, too, are
typically cast in progressive terms, often taking it
for granted that the discipline is a social science, at
any rate in its scholarly mode (Beattie, 2005: 87;
Riahi-Belkaoui, 2004: 40).
In this paper I suggest a different perspective. I
argue that the move from ‘classical approaches to
addressing questions’ and ‘traditional normative
research’ (Zeff, 1989: 171) to contemporary pro-
grammes, such as neo-empiricism (Henderson et
al., 1992) and the various ‘ways of seeing’
(Roslender, 1996: 542) embodied in radical
research, marks a rupture in the discipline. That
the UK financial accounting research community
now draws its methods almost exclusively from the
mainstream social sciences, and that ‘academics
have largely disengaged from traditional normative
theorising in relation to financial statements’
(Beattie, 2005: 93), is not in dispute, but I argue
that financial accounting research is social scientific
tout court, not because it was always so, and
moving progressively towards its current level of
sophistication, but because the academy broke with
its past and made a turn to mainstream social
science.1
If we follow Reiter and Williams (2002: 575) in
taking progress in scholarship to be ‘defined as
innovation and relevance’, the adoption of the
methods of mainstream social science would be
progressive if the bounty of innovative and relevant
findings accruing from the new approaches sub-
stantially exceeded that from classical research in
the phase before its abandonment. Alternatively, the
move might be seen as progressive if the epistemo-
logical position of the classical programme had
been demonstrated to be fundamentally flawed.2
However, I argue that neither of these conditions is
satisfied. It is important to emphasise that I am not
arguing that contemporary programmes are invalid
in their own terms but only that their results do not
justify the abandonment of the classical programme
– that its abandonment did not represent a progres-
sive move but rather a turn to new forms of inquiry.
If it was not a progressive move, why did the turn
to mainstream social science come about?
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1 It could reasonably be argued that, since financial account-
ing is a form of social practice and financial accounting research,
and probably even financial accounting practice, should aspire
to be scientific, financial accounting is a social science. Classical
accounting research certainly borrowed – and adapted for its
own use – ideas from economics. The argument of this paper
relates to the adoption by financial accounting researchers of the
methods of the mainstream social sciences (particularly eco-
nomics and sociology) rather than merely the importation of
their ideas modified for the particular demands of research into
financial reporting systems. In the interests of brevity, however,
I do not always include the term ‘mainstream’.
2 It is not suggested that epistemology is a matter of choice or
that research should be defended by reference to epistemology
but only that fundamental flaws in the epistemological position
of a programme would constitute grounds for moving on.
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Discussing the development of one branch of neo-
empiricism in the USA, Whitley (1988: 631) has
argued that ‘doubts about the epistemological and
practical value of ‘‘positive accounting theory’’ lead
to an alternative, sociological, explanation of its
growth and institutionalisation’. I suggest that
doubts about the progressive nature of the transition
to contemporary modes of research in general argue
for a sociological explanation of this wider phe-
nomenon and I sketch out the beginnings of such an
explanation.
The paper’s contribution to the literature is
fourfold. First, it argues that two decades of UK
neo-empirical research since the turn to social
science have not resulted in the refinement of
classical theory that Whittington (1986) held out
hope for. Rather, Chambers (1990) and Sterling
(1990) were right that neo-empiricism represented
an abandonment of the classical programme’s
objects of inquiry. Further, work on the new objects
of inquiry has achieved limited success. Second, it
draws attention to the radical programme’s similar
concern with objects of inquiry other than those of
the classical programme – and its equally limited
success. Third, it argues that the turn to social
science requires a sociological explanation and
begins the development of such an explanation.
Finally, in the light of the circumstances in which
the classical programme was abandoned, it calls for
a revival of the programme.
The paper follows the lines of the argument set
out above. The next section examines the orthodoxy
of the transition to contemporary modes of research,
demonstrating its claim to progressiveness. The
following sections discuss the fruitfulness of the
two major contemporary programmes and the
epistemological position of the classical pro-
gramme. Next, the turn to mainstream social
science is plotted in terms of the objects of inquiry
for financial accounting research. A sociological
account of the forces that brought the turn about is
then sketched. The final section discusses the
implications of the arguments for the future of
scholarly financial accounting research.
My primary focus is on the UK research com-
munity. However, it is impossible to disentangle
epistemological and sociological developments in
the UK from those in the USA because of the
intimate relationship between the two communities
(Beattie, 2002: 95; Whittington, 1981a: 24). This is
especially so in the case of neo-empiricism, where
there is a strong tendency for the UK to follow the
USA – indeed to ‘replicate . . . the thrust of US
studies’ (Beattie, 2005: 97). Sociologically, the case
of the UK is perhaps of more interest, partly because
neo-empiricism was resisted for longer and partly
because the UK has adopted a more epistemologi-
cally tolerant attitude, while nonetheless fully
embracing the social scientific turn.
2. The orthodoxy of the transition to
contemporary modes of research
Beattie’s (2002) widely drawn outline of the history
of financial accounting research exemplifies the
orthodoxy of the transition to contemporary pro-
grammes. It focuses on the UK context (Ryan et al.,
2002: 1) while reflecting the powerful influence of
the USA. Where it overlaps with Whittington’s
earlier historical sketch (Whittington, 1986) it
follows much the same approach.
Beattie begins by explaining that ‘financial
accounting research has gone through a number of
distinct phases’ (2002: 94). Early phases involved
‘attempting to generalise about the principles
underlying observed practices’ (2002: 100), fol-
lowed by the search for ‘a measure of ‘‘true
income’’’ (2002: 101). She then suggests that
‘these different approaches began to converge
after the Second World War’ (2002: 100). This
represents a claim of ‘progress as incorporation’
(Losee, 2004: 5). As a result, and here she calls on
Nelson’s much-employed encomium, ‘the decade of
the 1960s was a golden age in the history of a priori
research in accounting’ (Nelson, 1973: 4).3 The next
phase was stimulated by a development in account-
ing practice, namely increased attention to standard
setting, which triggered a search for ‘ways of
selecting among the alternative income determin-
ation models which had been developed by a priori
accounting researchers’ (Beattie, 2002: 102). The
approach favoured during this phase was decision
usefulness: shareholders were held to need infor-
mation about future cash flows and ‘the financial
statements with the greatest predictive ability would
best meet the information needs of shareholders,
and choices between alternative accounting
methods could be based on an assessment of their
effects on predictive ability’ (2002: 102).
Beattie’s characterisation of the adoption of
decision usefulness has a progressive tone: it
‘succeeded in moving accounting research away
from the search for ‘‘true income’’’ (2002: 101).
Elsewhere (Beattie, 2005) she has described the
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3 An a priori concept, statement or judgment is one held prior
to experience. Nelson explicitly disclaimed credit for introdu-
cing the phrase ‘a priori research’ into the debate; this was done,
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contributing, who did not define it but provided some examples
(Nelson, 1973: 3), namely works by Chambers (1966), Edwards
and Bell (1961), Sterling (1970) and Ijiri (1967).
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rejection of ‘true income’ theory in terms which
suggest that it was the result of anomalies arising
under the theory:
‘Gradually, however, the limitations of the
income model became increasingly apparent. It
was unable to offer guidance on the appropriate
accounting treatment of thorny accounting issues
such as pensions and goodwill’ (2005: 88).4
The elimination of anomalies is a common test of
progressiveness in natural science (Losee, 2004:
157).Whittington’s earlier outline also suggests that
the transition from the golden age was progressive:
‘There was disillusionment with the grand a
priori theorising of the 1960s . . . It was felt that
the way to resolve such a debate was by resort to
empirical evidence, to establish which theories
had the most realistic assumptions or the greatest
capacity to predict observed events’
(Whittington, 1986: 24).
While the 1960s may have marked the high point
of a priori research in the USA,5 a priori income
theory continued to flourish in the UK into the
1970s. Indeed, it was ‘central to the UK research
effort’ (Beattie, 2002: 98) during this period of rapid
growth in the British academic accounting commu-
nity. Whittington’s 1981 survey of the British
contribution to income theory traces its develop-
ment through the 1970s, explicitly limiting the
account to a priori theorising (Whittington, 1981a:
1), and concludes that, ‘it seems likely that a flow
measure, or measures, analogous to income will
play an important role in the theory and practice of
financial accounting for a considerable time to
come’ (1981a: 24, emphasis added).
Unfortunately decision usefulness ‘did not suc-
ceed in providing the logical basis for accounting
choices which its advocates had hoped for’ (Beattie,
2002: 102). Beattie nonetheless credits it with
progressive consequences because it ‘stimulated
two principal types of empirical study’ (2002: 103)
which constitute the next phase of research. These
continue to be undertaken today, and one, market-
based research, constitutes the largest area of
‘conventional’ financial accounting research in the
UK today (Beattie, 2005, Table 2).6 Moreover,
contemporary UK researchers have largely with-
drawn from traditional financial accounting theor-
ising (Beattie, 2005: 93). Hence it would seem
reasonable to characterise this phase as the begin-
ning of modern research in financial accounting.
One approach described by Beattie is the ‘posi-
tive accounting theory’ associated mainly with the
USA (2002: 106–109). This is ‘a particularly
extreme form of empiricism’ whose ‘advocates
. . . distance themselves as far as possible from the
normative methodologies of the a priori theorists’
(106). Although Beattie treats it separately from
market-based research, the work of this school is
strongly bound up in the emergence of the new
wave of empiricism and Whittington (1986: 25–27)
explicitly includes it within a broader classification
of empirical research referred to in this paper as neo-
empiricism (Henderson et al., 1992). The neo-
empiricist programme emerging in the USA in the
late 1960s rapidly achieved hegemonic status in that
country (Reiter and Williams, 2002) and orthodox
accounts of US historical developments (Beaver,
1998; Scott, 2003; Wells, 1976) naturally regard the
move as progression in the form of revolutionary
overthrow (Losee, 2004: 157).
The way in which Beattie (2002) contrasts
golden age theorists and modern empiricists has
distinctly progressive overtones: ‘the a priori
researchers conducted no formal testing of their
deductively derived conclusions . . . the empirical
researchers, however, formally tested their hypoth-
eses’ (2002: 106), a description which, read in the
context of orthodox accounts of scientific method,
would certainly indicate an advance. Further, in
Beattie’s view empiricism has been ‘very product-
ive’ (2002: 112) and she concludes that contempor-
ary conventional accounting research ‘is now a
more balanced combination of theory and empirical
analysis’, representing ‘a new level of maturity’
(2002: 112). Her account of conventional financial
accounting research concludes by welcoming an
‘important recent trend’ which has seen ‘the coming
together of, arguably the best of’ several perspec-
tives (progress as incorporation), namely a ‘return to
the measurement perspective’ as exemplified by
residual income valuation modelling (2002: 109).
Beattie also discusses the principal contemporary
alternative to neo-empiricism, which I will refer to
as the radical accounting research programme.7
This responds to ‘calls for researchers to study the
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4 The title of this article tells us that its subject is the UK’s
contribution to ‘moving the financial accounting research front
forward’, an apparently progressive claim.
5 Although one of the most distinguished was Australian,
most of the theorists involved were American (Gaffikin, 1988).
6 The term ‘conventional’ is used in the source to exclude
‘research grounded in critical perspectives’ (Beattie, 2005: 86,
note 1).
7 Beattie mainly uses the terms ‘interdisciplinary perspec-
tives’ and ‘critical accounting research’ (2002: 110, for example)
although she does also refer to ‘radical’ (110) studies. Other
advocates of the approach use the term ‘radical’ (see, for
example, Chua, 1986). I have adopted a single ‘catch-all’ term
merely in the interests of brevity.
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social nature of accounting and, in particular, to
examine the role of financial reporting in its
economic, social and political contexts’ rather
than base research on ‘an acceptance of the existing
social order’ (2002: 110). She claims here, too, to
identify ‘a new level of maturity’ (2002: 112).
Beattie and Davie (2006) provide a review of the
literature on the development of accounting thought
(covering practice as well as scholarly research),
stretching from the invention of double-entry
bookkeeping to the present day; they examine two
Kuhnian studies of the transition from classical
accounting research (Cushing, 1989; Mouck, 1993)
and place a progressive gloss on their findings,
against the interpretation of the original authors (see
the end of Section 5). Surveys of accounting
research aimed at undergraduates, even in the
USA, take a more ambivalent line about the move
to contemporary modes of research than sources,
such as Beattie (2002), directed at postgraduates
and academics. Probably the best known, that by
Riahi-Belkaoui (2004), borrows Ritzer’s model of
sociology as a ‘multiple-paradigm science’ and
includes among the paradigms ‘striving for accept-
ance’ (Riahi-Belkaoui, 2004: 336) the true income
paradigm and the even earlier anthropological/
inductive paradigm. A survey aimed at the UK
(Deegan and Unerman, 2006), argues that ‘there is a
role for prescription’ (2006: 14) and discusses a
number of theories from the golden age; indeed, it
implies that the inductivist approach remains valid
(2006: 7). Presumably undergraduate texts find it
necessary to treat classical approaches as valid so as
to square their account with the continuing use of
such approaches in accounting practice, including
standard-setting.
3. The fruitfulness of contemporary
programmes
Beattie (2002) concludes that two modes of
research now ‘dominate the literature’ (2002: 112),
the empirically-based programmes of neo-empiri-
cism and behavioural accounting and a radical
programme. Her survey of contemporary ‘conven-
tional’ (i.e. non-radical) British research shows that
market-based accounting research ‘dominates’ the
field (Beattie 2005: 92). She categorises just over a
quarter of studies as within this programme
(Table 2) but a number of her other categories,
including disclosure (20%), accounting choice
(5%), earnings management (4%), and economic
consequences (3%), are essentially neo-empirical
(see Parker, 2007: 42). Accordingly, consideration
of the fruitfulness of contemporary programmes
will, for reasons of space, be limited to neo-
empiricism and the radical programme.
3.1. The neo-empirical programme
In 1991, as the momentum of the move away from
classical research was becoming irresistible in the
UK, a number of leading neo-empiricists in the
USA met under the auspices of the American
Accounting Association (AAA) to produce a report
on what they saw as the ‘widespread sense among
accounting researchers and practitioners that aca-
demic accounting, particularly on the research level,
currently faces a serious crisis’ (Demski et al., 1991:
1).8 Since neo-empiricism had dominated research
in the USA since the 1970s, this crisis was a crisis of
neo-empiricism. Among the symptoms of crisis the
group identified were that, whereas ‘most academic
research areas are characterized by cycles of
significant innovations . . . innovations in account-
ing research are practically non-existent’; and that,
‘despite considerable research effort, it does not
seem that we are any closer now than we were 20–
30 years ago to addressing the fundamental issues in
accounting, such as the optimal choice of account-
ing standards and the optimal structure of account-
ing institutions’ (1991: 1–2).
Though neo-empiricism may lack cycles of
innovation, it is possible to discern cycles of a
different sort. A characteristic of the programme is
its apparent potential for the development of an
integrated and cohesive theory (Peasnell, 1981:
107–108). It is thus unsurprising that highly
regarded neo-empiricist scholars have devoted
considerable time to producing periodic ‘stock-
taking’ reviews; such reviews have been published
at intervals of roughly a decade since the 1960s.9
They reveal a cycle of optimism about the prospect
of innovation from one source being replaced by
criticism once its ideas are found wanting –
accompanied by equally buoyant optimism about
another potential source.
The earliest stock-taking was a contribution to
the conference that received Nelson’s ‘Golden Age’
paper. Hakansson (1973: 160) found empirical
research ‘still in its infancy’ and devoted his
concluding section to a discussion of predictive
ability, which he thought offered ‘great promise’
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9 Like the programme itself, the surveys are dominated by US
work, but since this work leads the way, the reviews have
significance beyond the USA and are thus employed in this
paper. Most of the reviews cited by Beattie’s UK-oriented
surveys of methods and studies (Beattie, 2002, 2005) are
likewise of US origin. A review covering British findings is
discussed towards the end of this section.
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(1973: 160). In 1982 the Journal of Accounting
Research published a series of literature reviews:
two dealt with empirical research in financial
reporting, one wide-ranging (Ball and Foster,
1982), the other (Lev and Ohlson, 1982) devoted
specifically to what was now called market-based
research. Predictive ability fell within the remit of
Ball and Foster (1982). They described work in this
area as having achieved ‘limited progress to date’
(1982: 215) and argued that ‘the most articulated
paradigm guiding the empirical research surveyed
. . . is associated with the ‘‘stewardship-contract
monitoring’’ literature.’ But ‘the results of empirical
exercises guided by this paradigm [had] not been
impressive’ (1982: 191). Like Hakansson (1973) a
decade earlier, their explanation for this disappoint-
ing state is that it ‘reflects the early stage of the
development of this paradigm’ (1982: 191).
The survey of market-based research concluded
that:
‘early studies appearing to indicate investor
rationality have given way to discomfiting
findings. It is now clear that the existence of
some investor irrationality cannot be precluded
. . . When the scope of inquiry is extended to
include effects on management compensation
and contractual arrangements, it appears that
almost all accounting changes can have real
effects . . . Research on all these important issues
is in its infancy, and results are far from
conclusive’ (Lev and Ohlson, 1982: 250).
There was, however, one bright note: ‘for the
stock market consequences of accounting regula-
tion, it is comforting to conclude that . . . results
appear to be consistent and even conclusive’ (1982:
250).
The next survey was presented at another
Illinois conference. In connection with the com-
ment on accounting regulation, quoted immedi-
ately above, one author wrote, ‘I disagree with the
Lev-Ohlson conclusion . . . because it is an
overstatement of the results’ (Dopuch, 1989: 49).
The review of capital markets studies reported that
few had been published since 1985 (Bernard,
1989: 73) and the editor’s summary of the review
concluded that it showed that, ‘in spite of several
decades of serious research, it is clear that we still
know very little about the complex workings of
modern capital markets’ (Frecka, 1989: 14).
Another paper (Abdel-khalik et al., 1989) con-
cluded as follows:
‘First, evidence about the income-smoothing
hypothesis continues to elude researchers . . .
Second, corporations and accounting firms do
lobby for their preferred accounting standards
. . . [but a]gain, hard evidence is difficult to
obtain . . . Third, the role of contractual arrange-
ments in affecting the choice of accounting
methods and accounting accruals has been
brought to the forefront . . . [but t]he state-of-
art in this area has progressed somewhat slowly’
(1989: 175).
It is not difficult to see why the AAA group
reached the conclusion it did in 1991. But have
things improved since? The most recent general
survey occupies two full volumes of the Journal
of Accounting & Economics. A review of capital
markets research by Kothari (2001) offers no
overall evaluation but his discussant identifies
market efficiency as the ‘watershed issue’ (Lee,
2001, emphasis suppressed) and, on this, Kothari
concludes that, although ‘we do not observe
systematic, large differences in the prices of firms
employing different accounting methods’ there is
evidence that, ‘over long horizons differences in
accounting methods produce measurable differ-
ences in risk-adjusted stock returns. Whether
these abnormal returns suggest a modest degree
of market inefficiency or they are a manifestation
of the problems in accurately measuring long-
horizon price performance is unresolved’ (2001:
199). This conclusion is very close to that
reported by Lev and Ohlson (1982) 20 years
earlier.
A second paper deals with accounting choice
(Fields et al., 2001). Its authors ‘conclude that there
has been, at best, modest progress in understanding
the motivations for and consequences of accounting
choice, with the rate of progress slowing in the last
decade (Francis, 2001: 317). A third is devoted to
value-relevance (Holthausen and Watts, 2001).
According to Beattie:
‘The association between accounting numbers
and equity market values . . . received renewed
interest during the 1990s, under the label ‘‘value
relevance’’. There is often a suggestion in the
literature that such studies can help standard-
setters by indicating the ‘‘usefulness’’ of various
accounting numbers’ (2002: 105).
But the reviewers’ conclusion, arrived at after this
‘renewed interest’, was that, ‘while the . . . value-
relevance literature is large, its contribution to
standard setting seems modest’ (Holthausen and
Watts, 2001: 63).
The usefulness of its output to accounting regu-
lators has always represented an important measure
CCH - ABR Data Standards Ltd, Frome, Somerset – 13/5/2010 04 ABR Rutherford.3d Page 153 of 172
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of fruitfulness for neo-empiricists.10 The discus-
sants of the 2001 review on value relevance did not
agree with its conclusion, arguing that ‘the value
relevance literature provides fruitful insights for
standard-setting’ (Barth et al., 2001: 98). In the light
of this opinion, it is illuminating to examine a paper
published by one of those discussants, Barth (2000),
setting out, just a little before the review paper, what
she saw as the ‘implications for financial reporting’
of valuation-based accounting research. She
addresses four topics. On the first she concludes,
‘what is left to learn about fair value accounting?
Much’ (2000: 21). On cash flow versus accruals she
again concludes that, ‘there is much left to learn’
(2000: 23). On the third issue, she reports that:
‘Research to date on issues related to recognition
versus disclosure is rather limited. It is difficult to
obtain clear insights on this issue from empirical
research because there are virtually always
confounding effects . . . What is left to learn?
Even more than for fair value accounting or cash
flows versus accruals’ (2000: 24).
Finally ‘research indicates that measuring har-
monisation is difficult . . . What is left to learn?
Almost everything we would like to know’ (2000:
25–26). Given her views, we can take it that Barth
chose these topics specifically to give a favourable
impression of the merits of the literature.
By the turn of the century, the cycle of optimism
and disillusionment can be discerned within sub-
areas of the literature. For example, recall that in
2002 Beattie considered that residual income valu-
ation modelling represented an important recent
development combining the best of several
approaches (see Section 2). She particularly singled
out Ohlson’s ‘clean surplus’ approach (Beattie,
2002: 109). Yet, at more or less the time her paper
was being drafted, Kothari’s review was pointing
out that the way it is constructed ‘renders the
Feltham-Ohlson model devoid of any accounting
content . . . because the model does not offer any
guidance or predictions about firms’ choice of
accounting methods or properties of accounting
standards’ (Kothari, 2001: 177). A more recent
survey specifically devoted to accounting-based
valuation models reported that,
‘Some empirical researchers have become disen-
chanted with [residual income, insofar as it deals
with reported accounting numbers rather than
forecasts], pointing to the apparent misspecifica-
tion of the linear information dynamics of the . . .
models . . . Further, attempts to modify [them]
have not improved the valuation relation per-
formance of models . . . Finally, every attempt to
date to resolve the other information conundrum
by substituting observables for unobservables
has led to the realization that omitted variables
remain’ (Richardson and Tinaikar, 2004: 246).
Again, the section of Holthausen and Watts’
review (2001: 64–66) offering suggestions for
future research devotes more space to conservatism
than any other topic, specifically citing studies by
Basu (1997) and Ball et al. (2000). Yet a recent
review of work on conservatism provides evidence
that results from a range of studies, including the
two papers cited by Holthausen and Watts, ‘are
attributable to biased test statistics rather than to
conservatism’ (Dietrich et al., 2007: 96).
The sole non-US survey (Dumontier and
Raffournier, 2002) cited by Beattie (2005) covers
the whole of Europe but as there is evidence of a
‘British hegemony over Europe-based accounting
research’ (Cámara et al., 1999: 473) it seems likely
that its findings largely reflect the state of the British
literature. Its authors conclude that the studies
surveyed ‘provide little evidence useful to standard-
setting bodies for the assessment of accounting
standards or to managers in forming disclosure
strategies to communicate effectively with invest-
ors’ (Dumontier and Raffournier, 2002: 145).
On any realistic appraisal, then, reasons to be
cautious about the reliability of neo-empiricism’s
innovations and the relevance of its findings to
financial reporting were apparent from the early
1980s.11 A decade later, as we saw at the beginning
of this section, even distinguished proponents of the
programme were expressing their doubts.
Subsequent contributions to the literature give little
reason to revise an attitude of caution.
3.2. The radical programme
Interdisciplinary, interpretive, critical or radical
accounting researchers subscribe to a number of
different ‘world views’ (Chua, 1986) or ‘ways of
seeing’ (Roslender, 1996: 540) and, indeed, dis-
agree about which ‘ways of seeing’ qualify for
which titles (Roslender and Dillard, 2003: 326;
Ryan et al., 2002: 41–44). Although radical
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10Members and staff of the US Financial Accounting
Standards Board have from time to time expressed the view
that research actually produced has been of limited relevance to
their task and called for classical research: see, for example
Leisenring and Johnson (1994) and Van Riper (1994: 52–53).
11 The programme has attracted extensive epistemological
critique (Reiter andWilliams, 2002: 592, cite 21 studies, adding
that this represents ‘by no means an exhaustive list’); five
critiques appeared as early as 1982 and 1983, and one of these
was by British authors (Lowe et al., 1983).
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researchers often claim to be excluded from the
mainstream of accounting research12 in fact, as
Beattie points out (2005: 86, note 1), ‘‘‘critical
accounting’’ is increasingly entering the main-
stream outside the US’.
Roslender and Dillard (2003) trace the emer-
gence in the 1970s of a radical accounting project,
drawing on the critical sociology of Marxist theory
and the work of the Frankfurt School, and its
displacement in the mid-1980s by a Foucauldian
perspective (see also Gendron and Baker, 2005).
Non-Foucauldian approaches survive but earlier
influences have been joined, and are now domin-
ated, by postmodernist and post-structuralist per-
spectives (Roslender, 1996: 541). In its
heterogeneity, radical accounting research simply
resembles, of course, the wider domain of social
theory (Ritzer and Smart, 2001: 4). Ritzer, who
introduced the notion of sociology as a ‘multiple-
paradigm science’ (1975), argues that sociology has
now become even more diverse: ‘the result is a wide
open theoretical world, one that is so unrestricted
and contested that it borders on, if it has not already
descended into, chaos’ (Ritzer and Goodman, 2004:
A16–17). Radical accounting researchers even
disagree about what response the existence of a
multiplicity of perspectives should provoke. Is the
appropriate attitude, ‘tolerance, willingness to lis-
ten, and respect for alternative views’ as advocated
byMerino (1998: 603), or should proponents of one
school slug it out against all-comers, an approach
certainly practised by, for example, Tinker (2005)?
The variegated – perhaps chaotic – nature of the
radical programme makes it difficult to judge its
results in the round. There is an abundant literature
critical of every aspect of the social theorising on
which the radical programme draws, from its most
general epistemology (see, for example, Nagel,
2001) to the detailed content of its individual
positions; for critiques broadly sympathetic to the
radical project, see, for example, Best and Kellner
(1991) and Sarup (1993). Perhaps the most funda-
mental challenge is offered by Nagel (2001: 15): ‘It
is usually a good strategy to ask whether a general
claim about truth or meaning applies to itself’. It is
by applying this test to the work of Foucault and his
disciples, the dominant school within radical
accounting research from the mid-1980s according
to Roslender and Dillard (2003), that Sanbonmatsu
(2004) is able to write in the following terms:
‘Foucault’s refusal of the Lebenswelt – the
quotidian world of meaning . . . reduces the
first-order meanings of human civilization –
including its sophia, its wisdom – to the status
of shadows on a wall . . . [T]he only autonomous
‘‘being’’ not duped into mistaking the shadows of
‘‘experience’’ for experience, is the archaeologist
[i.e. the theorist] herself . . . ‘‘Experience’’ only
becomes intelligible, real, when a genealogist
like Foucault or Scott or Spivak is on hand to
observe it’ (2004: 111–13).
Gendron and Baker (2005) use a Foucauldian
‘sociology of translation’ approach to model the
dissemination of Foucauldian ideas within account-
ing research, arguing that ‘academic endeavours are
subject to tension between originality (differenti-
ation) and imitational conformity’ (2005: 536), with
the adoption of a Foucauldian perspective by a few
scholars representing the initial act of originality.
But the tension between innovation and imitation
might equally well be cast in terms of a purely
imitative adoption of any original perspective from
social theory and attempts to expand and enrich it
by examining accountancy itself. Thus, when
Macintosh (2002) concludes his book-length
review of ‘poststructuralist positions’ on account-
ancy with the insight that,
`Nietzsche wrote, ‘‘‘Truth’ is therefore not some-
thing there, that might be found or discovered –
but something that must be created and that gives
a name to a process, or rather to a will to
overcome that has in itself no end . . . It is a word
for the ‘will to power’.’’ Could it be, then, that
accounts which are deemed to be ‘‘true and fair’’
or ‘‘presented fairly’’ are also only words for the
will to power?’ (2002: 134, original citation
omitted),
he is claiming nothing more than that, supposing
Nietzsche to be right about the world at large, his
(Nietzsche’s) characterisation holds true for
accountancy.
Armstrong (1994: 38) puts the point thus: it ‘has
been typical of much Foucauldian accounting
research’ that it proceeds ‘only outwards from
Foucault’s concepts and insights, rather than back
into them after an encounter with empirical data’.
Commenting more generally on the radical pro-
gramme, Humphrey (2001: 93) talks of ‘this
privileging of social theories . . . which never saw
such theories being altered by their exposure to
accounting’ and goes on to ask ‘how many [studies]
are needed before it can be accepted that accounting
is socially constructed, paradoxical, bound up with
CCH - ABR Data Standards Ltd, Frome, Somerset – 13/5/2010 04 ABR Rutherford.3d Page 155 of 172
12 For example, Roslender and Dillard (2003: 326) say that,
‘from the outset, research perspectives beyond that of neo-
classical economics have been, and continue to be, viewed
unfavourably by those who constitute the gatekeepers of
accounting knowledge’.
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power relations and has unintended consequences?’
Of course, studies that demonstrate that the insights
of social theory apply to accountancy have some
use, though they suffer the same flaws, if flaws there
be, of their root theory, a point demonstrated in the
context of Foucauldian accounting research by
Armstrong (1994: 28–29).
It may, indeed, be questionable whether the root
theories do actually apply to accountancy.
Armstrong points out that claims to offer analyses
of accounting systems as Foucauldian disciplinary
regimes, such as the famous study of standard
costing by Miller and O’Leary (1987: 31), collapse
the distinction between ‘moulding the actual details
of individual conduct’, a central concern for
Foucault, and the potential offered by both man-
agement and financial accounting for leaving
methods unspecified, provided desired results are
achieved. Again, attempts to employ the
Foucauldian notion of the ‘disciplinary society’,
‘basically a two-epoch model’ (Armstrong, 1994:
34), to explain relatively small-scale accounting
change, as in Hopwood’s equally famous study
(1987), stretch the concept in a way that, Armstrong
concludes, does nothing to ‘illuminate the question
of whether a consideration of accounting as power-
knowledge has anything to contribute to an under-
standing of accounting change’ (Armstrong, 1994:
34).
According to Armstrong (1994: 38), one of the
more ingenious Foucauldian studies in financial
accounting is that by Hoskin and Macve (1986).
This argues that double-entry bookkeeping was
translated from various ‘gridding’ practices in early
13th century scholasticism, such as the numbering
of paragraphs within texts. Yet the establishment of
a genealogical connection depends on demonstrat-
ing that the practices have more in common than
others excluded from consideration, which Hoskin
and Macve do not do (Armstrong, 1994: 49);
although they do demonstrate that the group
supposedly implicated in the extension of the
practices to accountancy was exposed to the alleged
prototypes, the evidence that its members perceived
the various practices as similar is only circumstan-
tial (Armstrong, 1994: 49). In any event such a
biographically-focused approach appears inconsist-
ent with Foucault’s own decentring of the subject.
Some social theorists proceed by ‘advocating
‘‘what ought to be out there’’ instead of uncovering
‘‘what is out there’’’, so that ‘sociological theorising
becomes ‘‘a mode of altering reality, not by the
direct application of energy to objects, but by the
creation of discourse which changes reality through
the mediation of thought and action’’’ (Zhao, 2001:
391, quoting Bitzer, 1968). In this case, ‘the success
of theorising is marked by the actualisation of what
is advocated rather than by the verification of what
is uncovered’ (Zhao, 2001: 391). This approach is,
naturally, to be found within the radical accounting
programme, with some taking it to be the defining
characteristic of its truly ‘critical’ branch, now to be
known as ‘enabling accounting’ (Broadbent et al.,
1997), and finding themselves ‘troubled by the
motivations of those who wish to be identified as
critical accountants but who have no inclination to
be associated with the political dimension of the
project’ (Roslender and Dillard, 2003: 327). For
those who ‘regard ‘‘reporting’’ as the sine qua non
of accounting’ (Tinker, 1999: 646), the challenge is
to find new financial statements that will secure the
desired social change. Some have risen to this
challenge, but the results generally appear banal.
The finale of Macintosh’s book, cited earlier, is a
proposal for what he calls ‘heteroglossic account-
ing’, following Bakhtin’s conception of the hetero-
glossic novel, which ‘gives equal weight to the
voices of both the characters and the author’
(Macintosh, 2002: 129). Its aim is to ‘produce a
report that allows the various ‘‘voices’’ currently
embedded, but muffled[,] in the monologic report to
‘‘speak’’’ (2002: 131). Macintosh’s example of such
a report records the results of oil and gas operations
using all four well-known accounting policies advo-
cated for use within the sector, that is, immediate
write-off, full costing, successful efforts and reserve
recognition (2002: 131–132). But such a report can
be thought of as an example of multi-column
reporting, as advocated by Professor Edward Stamp
(1981) a quarter of a century ago. Lest Stamp be
thought a closet postmodernist, it should be pointed
out that the UK profession advocated research on
multi-column reporting in 1975 (ASSC, 1975:
para. 7.40). Macintosh’s proposal thus seems to
achieve by radical theorisation what can perfectly
well be arrived at by conventional means.13
The paucity and banality of the proposals offered
by radical theorists accepting the challenge in the
terms set out above is, for other radical theorists,
simply a consequence of the technocratic and
reductionist nature of those terms (Tinker, 1999:
646 and note 6). Even apparently quite fundamen-
tally grounded platforms for change are vulnerable
to the charge of reductionism. As a case in point, we
can examine Lodh and Gaffikin’s (1997) response
to Laughlin’s (1987) advocacy of a Habermasian
framework to develop a critique of accounting
CCH - ABR Data Standards Ltd, Frome, Somerset – 13/5/2010 04 ABR Rutherford.3d Page 156 of 172
13 For further examples, see Fleischman and Radcliffe (2003:
16) and Armstrong (1994: 46).
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systems in an organisational context utilising
insights obtained by researchers. In Lodh and
Gaffikin’s view, Habermasian ‘‘‘sociation prin-
ciples’’ cannot be reduced to the methodological
corollary at the level of an individual researcher’
(Lodh and Gaffikin, 1997: 455) and thus the
prospect of changing an accounting system within
the Habermasian framework is postponed until
appropriate sociation principles are manifest in the
accounting world, or, possible, in the world at large.
How far has enabling accounting advanced? Not
very far, according to Roslender and Dillard (2003:
342): even within the ‘research community’, appar-
ently, ‘there are many fields within the mainstream
in which the critical accounting project is still
largely unknown’.
Given the nature of the radical programme, this
evaluation of its fruitfulness has necessarily con-
centrated on the robustness of its theoretical
insights. It may well be that the chaos observed
by Ritzer and Goodman (2004)14 is also the ‘new
level of maturity’ which Beattie (2002: 112) infers
from criticism from within the programme that it
has ‘lost its way because it is divided on methodo-
logical, philosophical and ideological lines’.15
Ritzer and Goodman ask what theorists can accom-
plish in such an environment: ‘one thing they
clearly cannot do is ‘‘advance’’ a theoretical
perspective. Such a notion is based on the dubious
idea of the existence of a well-defined theoretical
perspective’ (2004: A20). But theorists ‘can gain
new insights into the social world and can create
new theoretical ideas’ (2004: A20). It seems,
though, that the incremental bounty of the radical
accounting programme, its innovative and relevant
insights into the nature of accountancy – beyond the
insight that accountancy shares the character of
other social practices, whatever this may be – has so
far been limited. What we have is a shifting sea of
possibilities, all contestable and endlessly con-
tested, a field, like its parent discipline, ‘almost
constantly in flux’ (Ritzer and Smart, 2001: 4).
4. The epistemology of the classical
programme
4.1. The Illinois critique
Nelson’s (1973) essay is often cited, in the UK16 as
well as the USA, as early evidence of fundamental
dissatisfaction with classical research. His view of
the flaw in the programme was that,
‘if research is defined as the statement of
hypotheses and the testing of hypotheses, a priori
research might be called semi-research, because
it is concerned with the statement of hypotheses
on how accounting should be done, without the
testing of these hypotheses’ (1973: 3–4).
This critique appears to embrace the position,
known as hypothetico-deductivism, generally asso-
ciated with Karl Popper, whose work, The Logic of
Scientific Discovery, was first published in English
in 1959 (Jarvie, 2005: 821).
Hakansson’s (1973) contribution to the same
conference offers a rather different role for empiri-
cism in financial accounting research. He is clear
that accounting theorisation involves a normative
dimension: ‘we have worried and do worry more
about what accountants should do rather than what
they do do’ (141).17 For Hankansson,
‘empirical research is . . . essential . . . in deter-
mining the descriptive fit of the premises which
underlie normative theories, and hence in satis-
fying one of the requirements (the other being the
impeccability of the logic) for acceptance of a
normative theory in making the ‘‘best’’ choice’
(1973: 141).
His survey of empirical research reflects this
view, being structured in terms of the various
premises that individual studies can be considered
to test. A commentary on Nelson’s paper by Larson
(1973) also took issue with Nelson’s view.
According to Larson, ‘the significance of a priori
research to the development of accounting is
absolute’ on the grounds that ‘accounting is very
largely a process of number assignment . . . and . . .
analytical or a priori research plays a primal role in
the evaluation of alternative number assignments’
(1973: 29).
4.2. The nature of a priori justification
Epistemologically, the term ‘a priori’, ‘typically
connotes a kind of knowledge or justification that
does not depend on evidence, or warrant, from
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14 See the quotation earlier in this section.
15 See Section 2. The second quotation is drawn by Beattie
from an unpublished version of Roslender and Dillard (2003);
the phrase does not appear as such in the published version.
16 For example, byWhittington (1986), in the comments from
which the quotation in Section 2 is drawn.
17 Classifications of financial accounting research frequently
use ‘a priori’ and ‘normative’ interchangeably. For example
Deegan and Unerman (2006) agree with Beattie (2002) that
there is a research programme exemplified by the work of
Chambers (especially 1966), Edwards and Bell (especially
1961), and Sterling (especially 1970), but refer to it as
‘normative’ (121–166) when Beattie uses ‘a priori’ (Beattie,
2002). Beattie’s survey of British financial accounting research
(2005: 93) uses ‘normative’ and ‘a priori’ as implied synonyms
in describing the same type of research.
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sensory experience’ (Moser, 2005: 1). Such know-
ledge is acquired ‘using only [one’s] powers of
reasoning’ (O’Brien, 2006: 25). If those who
attached the label to the work of the golden age
theorists intended to consign its achievements to
oblivion, they could hardly have chosen more
astutely. The following text is extracted from an AS
level primer in epistemology:
‘The fascination with a priori truths . . . has a
long philosophical history. To regard such know-
ledge as having a privileged status, and to hold it
as a benchmark for all other knowledge claims, is
one of the main features of rationalism . . . [But]
the rationalist project appears to have failed. The
dream of grounding any substantial knowledge
of the world on the back of the absolute
certainties of reason could not be realised’
(Cardinal et al., 2004: 43 and 70).
Or, to quote from a work by one of the leading
representatives of the school of logical positivism,
originally published in 1936, ‘to say that a propos-
ition is true a priori is to say that it is a tautology.
And tautologies, though they may serve to guide us
in our empirical search for knowledge, do not in
themselves contain any information about any
matter of fact’ (Ayer, 1990: 52).
Empiricists such as logical positivists regard all a
priori truths as what Immanuel Kant called ‘ana-
lytic’ statements, in contrast to ‘synthetic’ truths,
which ‘do not simply depend on what our terms
mean, but also on how the world happens to be’
(O’Brien, 2006: 27). But Kant himself did not
believe that all a priori truths are analytic. Included
in his own list of synthetic a priori truths are those
that underpin empirical investigation, such as the
belief that events have causes (Morton, 2003: 46).
Contemporary philosophy continues to embrace a
wide range of views about the existence, nature and
scope of a priori knowledge (BonJour, 2005; Devitt,
2005). To know that something that is red all over
cannot be green all over is an a priori truth but not
one that appears to be analytic. If it were so, the
concept of ‘red all over’ would be reducible to ‘not
green all over’ and ‘not blue all over’ and ‘not
yellow all over’ etc. and this is implausible: it would
seem that we can possess the concept ‘red’ without
possessing the concepts of all other colours
(O’Brien, 2006: 27). In the same way, mathemat-
ical truths can be argued to be synthetic: ‘I
can understand ‘‘12’’ without understanding
‘‘(Ö4Ö9)273’’’ (O’Brien, 2006: 28).
Among, as Peacocke (2005) charmingly puts it,
‘friends of the a priori’ (2005: 742), it is accepted
that ‘the range of propositions that are a priori is vast
and varied’ (Peacocke, 2005: 745). Examples
offered by Peacocke in defence of his claim of
particular relevance to financial accounting theory
include the principles of rational decision theory
and ‘much of economics’ (2005: 745).18 Speaking
of his full list, he says that ‘it is often clear that a
proposition is a priori, while the nature of the
justification or entitlement for belief in the propos-
ition remains unclear . . . The identification of the
full nature of the entitlement that sustains a priori
knowledge, as opposed to its existence, is an open
question in almost all the domains mentioned
above’ (2005: 746).
Logical positivism, with its strongly dismissive
view of a priori knowledge, flourished in Europe
before, and in the USA after, the second world war
but was everywhere in decline by 1960, not least as
a result of the work of W.V. Quine (Friedman,
2005). Quine, writing in the 1950s and 1960s, drew
on the argument of the French physicist and
philosopher of science, Pierre Duhem, that ‘non-
observation sentences face the tribunal of experi-
ence not singly but in groups’ (Dancy, 1985: 92).
Claims other than those which report nothing
beyond the evidence of our senses, strictly inter-
preted, cannot be conclusively verified, or conclu-
sively falsified, by observation alone; they will
always be part of a more general theory and
‘because of this we have a choice where to alter
the theory when things go wrong at the observa-
tional level’ (Dancy, 1985: 92). For Quine, appar-
ently secure analytic truths such as that ‘a woman
giving birth to a child is its mother’ are subject to
revision on the basis of empirical evidence – such as
that the child is the result of in vitro fertilisation of
an ovum supplied by another woman (example
from Everitt and Fisher, 1995; cited in O’Brien,
2006: 131). Even mathematics and logic are subject
to change: ‘[r]evision even of the logical law of the
excluded middle has been proposed as a means of
simplifying quantummechanics’ (Quine, 1953: 43).
4.3. A priori justification and ‘scientific rigour’ in
the golden age
Though published in the 1960s, the grand theories
of the golden age are associated with methodo-
logical developments which took place during the
preceding five years (Gaffikin, 1988: 19). Gaffikin
argues that much the most important contribution to
this phase was made by Chambers in four articles,
the first of which (1955) ‘was indeed seminal’
CCH - ABR Data Standards Ltd, Frome, Somerset – 13/5/2010 04 ABR Rutherford.3d Page 158 of 172
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that they do not treat their basic assumptions as analytic, see
Udehn (2003: 152) and Hausman (1992).
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(Gaffikin, 1988: 17). Although, for Gaffikin, the
‘hallmark’ of the work was ‘the appeal to what was
understood to be the application of scientific rigour
to accounting research and theory construction’
(1988: 19), he nonetheless says of Chamber’s
apparently seminal work that, ‘while alluding to a
theory of scientific rigour, the argument can only be
admitted as a set of tentative hypotheses based on a
priori assumptions’ (1988: 18). In Gaffikin’s view,
Chambers’ articles make it ‘increasingly clear that
the formal methodology to which he was alluding
was hypothetico-deductivism’ (1988: 18) so that
‘with hindsight it is apparent that these early works
were leading to Chambers’ opus magnum,
Accounting, Evaluation and Economic Behaviour’
(1988: 18). This was one of the studies offered to
Nelson as an illustration of golden age theorising
and in it Gaffikin finds further evidence to ‘reinforce
the belief that [Chambers] employed hypothetico-
deductivism’ (1988: 21).
Despite his claim to discern hypothetico-deduc-
tivism in the work, Gaffikin concedes that
Chambers’
‘argument is analytically derived from basic
assumptions (postulates) which he claims are
derived from his observations of the business
world, together with notions generally accepted
in economic theory. This is the method
Mattessich refers to as being postulational’
(1988: 21).
Gaffikin explains that a postulational work ‘relies
on certain assumptions (axioms) from which con-
clusions are deduced’ (1988: 21) and treats the term
as synonymous with ‘a priori’ (1988: 24). After
examining all the works identified for Nelson as
examples of a priori theorising (and others),
Gaffikin summarises the ‘methodological soul-
searching by accounting writers’ during the 1960s
as concluding that ‘the prospect of the further
development of accounting ideas was seen to lie in
the application of the rigour of scientific method.
This was found in the various guises of logical
empiricism/positivism’ (1988: 23). He nonetheless
goes on to list a variety of terms used to describe the
methods involved, including ‘a priori’, ‘postula-
tional’, ‘normative’ and ‘deductive’ explaining that,
although ‘not all are accurate descriptions’, they do
‘relate to features of the methods’ (1988: 24).
It would appear, then, that the outcome of the
golden age’s concern with epistemological and
methodological issues was a commitment to scien-
tific rigour and a consequent desire for empirical
engagement which some are able to read as
embracing logical empiricism/positivism, and per-
haps even hypothetico-deductivism (see also
Mouck, 1989), but, at the same time, the continued
use of methods generally associated with a priori
theorising. This ambivalence may have made it
easier for Nelson to create a presumption for the
hypothetico-deductive method – a position which,
as Gaffikin’s characterisation of the methods used
by the golden age theorists demonstrates, cannot be
derived directly from their work and, further, is not
consistent with the philosophical use of the term ‘a
priori’. It may also have contributed to the difficulty
of defending golden age theorisation in its own
terms.
But such a defence would have been possible.
Ironically, perhaps, one could have been mounted
from a proper interpretation of the term ‘a priori’. As
we have seen in Section 4.1, Hakansson’s Illinois
contribution took a rather different line from
Nelson’s. For him, the model underpinning a
financial reporting system has a normative charac-
ter, unsusceptible to empirical testing. The contrast
between normativity, in the sense employed by
Hakansson, and empirical verification, need have
less significance for an analysis of the role of
accounting theory than it may appear to have at first
sight. If I have a sore throat and visit my doctor and
she tells me to take medicine X, she is employing an
overarching normative theory (I ought to take the
medicine) but one underpinned by: (a) observations
of people like myself, further confirmed by my
attendance at the surgery, that my objective is to be
restored to good health; (b) empirical verification
(as it happens, scientifically conducted) of the
relationship between taking medicine X and the
curing of sore throats; and (c) a range of other value
judgments and observations of means-ends rela-
tions covering cost, unpleasantness of treatments,
likelihood of success, and so forth.
Developments in rational decision theory and in
related areas within economics19 and operational
research taking place during the 1950s and 1960s
(see, for example, Simon, 1956, 1965) exhibit a
similar character to the example in the previous
paragraph, though with a heavier emphasis on the
logical linkages in the modelling (Mattessich, 2002:
187–188). On this view the non-empirical truths of
the golden age’s grand theories take the form of
synthetic a priori propositions. Hakansson is
merely holding that the theories are derived in part
from premises that are themselves susceptible to
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19 The role of a priori justification in economic theorisation
had been debated for more than a century before the 1960s
(Blaug, 1980: chapters 4–5), remained a live topic during the
decade (see, for example, Stone, 1966), and remains so now
(see, for example, Maki, 2002).
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empirical testing – and should, indeed, be so
tested.20 An approach to financial accounting as a
conditionally normative discipline has been
advanced by Mattessich, who developed a structure
ultimately termed Conditional-Normative
Accounting Methodology (CoNAM, see
Mattessich, 1995: ch. 11). Although initially pro-
posed in his 1964 work, the structure appeared in
complete form only during the 1970s (Archer,
1998: 310). It has elicited little interest, perhaps
because of its emerging fully only after the social
scientific turn in the USA and weaknesses in other
areas (Archer, 1998).
An alternative formulation of the defence might
have been offered from a Quinean position.
Accounting theorisation, it could have been argued,
occupies a position within the interior of the web of
accounting knowledge, nearer in form to logic and
mathematics than the experimental sciences.
Recalcitrant experience, for example in the form
of unstable prices, may require an adjustment to this
interior structure and it was on this particular work
that the golden age theorists were engaged.21
4.4. The UK response to the Illinois critique
In December 1979, nearly a decade after the Illinois
conference, another took place in London to ‘review
the current state of accounting research in the UK’
(Bromwich and Hopwood, 1981: xii). The principal
paper devoted to financial accounting theorisation
concerned income theory and was contributed by
Whittington (1981a). As we have seen in Section 2,
Whittington’s conclusion implies that a priori
theorising is alive and well in the UK.
After a further seven years, Whittington provided
an ‘overview’ of financial accounting theory (1986)
in which he referred to Nelson’s 1973 paper and
argued that,
‘There were and are two responses to this
critique. The first is to narrow the area of
disagreement by empirical research, rejecting
theories whose assumptions or predictions are at
variance with empirical evidence. This type of
research has become increasingly popular during
the past fifteen years or so . . . The second
response is to adopt an eclectic approach to
income measurement, providing a variety of
alternative measures . . . ’ (1986: 15).
The second response is, of course, a way of
handling the alleged indeterminacy of theory in
practice, not a prescription for theoretical advance.
While the first is formulated in a way that is even-
handed between hypothetico-deductivism (the test-
ing of predictions) and postulationalism (the testing
of assumptions), its focus on empiricism reflects the
decline in a priori work then occurring in the UK.
5. The turn to mainstream social science
Financial accounting research’s turn to mainstream
social science can be plotted by reference to its
‘objects of inquiry’, using the term in its Kantian
sense to denote,
‘the way in which phenomena in the social
domain (people, behaviour, actions) become
‘‘objects’’ of . . . inquiry by being classified in
certain ways, in specific contexts, and under
some descriptive conditions’ (Montuschi, 2003:
20).
According to Nelson (1973: 15), the hypothesis
underpinning a financial reporting system is that,
‘the proposed financial reporting will cause the
decision-maker to make decisions which will
enable him [sic] to reach the goals that have been
set, or at least result in more progress towards
these goals than would exist if alternative meas-
urement systems were to be used.’
Though it might be possible to test a system
empirically, for example along the lines envisaged
by Nelson, using the measurements resulting from
the system as part of the test (but not, of course, to
measure outcomes such as investor wealth, the
independent variable), the system itself does not
generate predictions that can be tested. Further,
testing the hypothesis in any rigorous way would be
profoundly difficult for a number of reasons
including the strict unavailability of the comparator
and the highly complex interrelationships between
the various economic and social factors involved,
which make applying the ceteris paribus condition
extremely difficult (Archer, 1998: 311–314), a point
made by Chambers himself in one of the papers
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testing offered by Chambers in the (1955) article referred to
earlier in this section:
‘If one is confronted with what purports to be a theory of
accounting, and finds that it deals with corporate accounting
only, the existence in reality of unincorporated ventures will
cast doubts on the validity of the propositions put forward’
(Chambers, 1955: 19).
21 Applying Nagel’s (2001) test (see Section 3.2) to Quine’s
(1953) ‘web of belief’ invites the question, ‘if all our beliefs are
revisable, is the belief that all our beliefs are revisable revisable?
(Ritchie, 2008: 202). Whether this gives rise to a formal paradox
is a matter of dispute within philosophy: for arguments that it
does, see Katz (1998) and Elstein (2007); for the opposite
position, see Adler (2003), Resnik and Orlandi (2003) and
Colyvan (2006). A response in keeping with Quine’s location
within the pragmatist tradition would be that, supposing the web
of belief model to be the best that can be achieved, we should
take it as good enough (Rescher, 2005: 747).
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alluded to earlier (Chambers, 1960: 38–39). So
scientifically rigorous empirical work on financial
reporting systems was never going to be easy.
Both Nelson (1973: 18) and Hakansson (1973)
(see Section 3.1) identified predictive ability as a
promising approach to the sort of empirical work
they were calling for. Predictive ability studies
respond directly to what are taken to be investors’
ultimate information needs, namely forecasts of
future events that will affect their wealth, typically
dividends or the corporate cash flows available to
pay them. They attempt to identify superior finan-
cial reporting methods on the basis of their useful-
ness in facilitating the generation of such
information. In so doing they retain the classical
programme’s focus on the traditional objects of
inquiry of financial accounting research, namely
financial reporting systems as systems, while enab-
ling researchers to bring statistically more sophis-
ticated methods to bear on their work. As Beattie
(2002: 102) reports, the first wave of empirical work
to follow the Illinois critique did indeed focus on
predictive ability. But, in 1979, probably the first
survey of empirical research in financial accounting
directed at a UK audience was reporting that
predictive ability studies, in both the USA and the
UK, were ‘extremely thin on the ground’ (Peasnell,
1981: 113).22 Its author drew attention to the size of
the challenge presented in designing tests of
predictive ability: (a) predictions require a forecast-
ing model as well as data and any test of predictive
ability will be a joint test of both; (b) realistic data
from financial reporting systems other than that
currently employed in statutory reporting will be
difficult to obtain; and (c) testing over a long time
horizon is required (1981: 112–114).
One response to the limited success of the
approach, in the face of problems recognised as
very challenging (for example, by Carsberg et al.,
1977: 421–422), would have been to redouble the
effort expended on addressing those problems.
Another would have been to seek alternative ways
of supplying empirical validation, such as adopting
the structure suggested by Hakansson (see Section
4.1 and later this section). Yet another would have
been to return to classical methods, mounting a
more robust defence of the programme, perhaps
following up the avenues suggested in Section 4.
What actually happened was rather different.
In Whittington’s view, a key factor implicated in
the growth of empiricism from the 1970s was the
influence of the Chicago (or Rochester) school
(Whittington, 1986: 24–25), that is, so-called
positive accounting theory. The epistemological
position of the Rochester school combines
Popperian falsificationalism and Friedmanite
instrumentalism (Watts and Zimmerman, 1986: 7–
12). In their search for tightly-defined hypotheses
that could be tested rigorously by statistically
sophisticated methods (in the case of the
Rochester School, the methods of quantitative
economics), neo-empiricists switched their atten-
tion from financial reporting systems as systems, to
any objects of inquiry identifiable within the
domain of financial reporting that might prove
amenable to such testing. Such objects included the
behaviour of those involved in the reporting process
and accounting numbers considered as independent
entities associated only loosely, if at all, with the
systems that generate them. Positivists, and other
neo-empiricists, often test hypotheses involving the
inputs or outputs of financial reporting systems: for
example, they tested whether ‘managers selected
accounting methods opportunistically to enhance
their own wealth’ (Beattie, 2002: 107) and ‘the way
in which the stock market, through share prices,
reacts to different types of accounting information’
(Beattie, 2002: 104). But these tests generally treat
the financial reporting system itself as a black box,
of relevance only in providing outputs or a frame-
work within which choices are made. As Barth’s
(2000) paper ultimately concedes, very little is
learnt about which outputs and choices would be
appropriate (see Parker, 2007: 42). The positivist’s –
and, to a considerable extent, the neo-empiricist’s –
approach to hypothesis formulation, considered as a
practical activity, is that of the pure social scientist:
questions asked are driven by the scope for rigorous
testing rather than the level of interest necessarily
attaching to the answers. As Zeff memorably put it,
studies are ‘the result of methods in search of
questions, rather than questions in search of
methods’ (Zeff, 1983: 134; see also Zeff, 1989).
There is widespread agreement that the paper by
Ball and Brown (1968) represents a watershed in the
development of financial accounting research
(Beattie, 2002: 104; Watts and Zimmerman, 1986:
15; Whittington, 1986: 25). Watts and Zimmer-
man’s well-known text on positive accounting
theory identifies the paper (perhaps claims it) as
marking the beginning of the literature they survey
(1986: 15) and spends eight pages describing it (40–
47). But Hakansson’s (1973: 146) stock-taking of
empirical work for the Illinois conference, which
explicitly viewed the role of such work as being to
test premises underlying financial reporting theory
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as then constituted, included the Ball and Brown
study, classified as a test of an ‘assumption bearing
on the question what: relevance (assets, claims and
changes in these)’ (1973: 144, emphasis supplied).
A number of other studies are also common to the
surveys by Hakansson and by Watts and
Zimmerman. The dividing line between the two is
not based on the design of individual studies, which
can thus be claimed by both sides. On the surface,
this enables positivism to be represented as ‘merely
an extension of the general direction of accounting
research since the late 1960s’ (Gaffikin, 1988: 31).
But the division does reflect a major difference in
the underlying epistemological stance of the sur-
veys. In one, individual studies are regarded as
contributing on a piecemeal basis to the overall
project of testing financial reporting systems as
systems; in the other, each study delivers a new
individual insight into the world of financial
reporting. In the latter case, as we have seen, the
objects of inquiry thus became the phenomena
captured by the empirics. By the mid-1980s in the
UK – somewhat earlier in the USA – the former
view was defunct. The predictive ability criterion
had been written off as a failure before the major
research programme called for by Carsberg et al.
(1977) had properly got under way and the studies
of Ball and Brown and others had been successfully
claimed for positivism.
Beattie (2002) describes the move to positive
accounting theory as ‘a reaction to the excessive a
priori theorizing in financial accounting in previous
decades’ (2002: 106; emphasis added). However,
by the time the calls for strong-form positivism
were at full throttle, financial accounting research
had, for example via predictive ability studies and
Hakansson’s scheme, begun to engage with empir-
ical methods of validation. Although Whittington
(1986: 24–25) characterises neo-empiricists as
motivated in part by the desire to resolve the debate
between competing golden age theorists, very few
serious attempts so to do were in fact made; once
empiricists had given up on predictive ability,
attempts at testing financial reporting systems as
systems were simply abandoned. Yet support for
positivism’s epistemological underpinning was far
from secure. Falsificationalism was, from the early
1970s onwards, coming to be largely rejected in
favour of more sophisticated approaches, on the
grounds that individual instances of adverse evi-
dence need not (and in practice do not necessarily)
lead to rejection of a theory, as opposed to
acceptance of some other explanation such as
imperfections in observation (Benton and Craib,
2001: 58–63). Friedmanite instrumentalism, which
holds that in testing theoretical models, ‘the only
question is which sort of model results in more
successful predictions’ (Hollis, 1994: 54), and that
the realism or otherwise of assumptions in the
model is irrelevant, has always been highly contro-
versial, even among positive economists (Hausman,
1994: 39–40; Hollis, 1994: 53–56).23 As Mouck
(1989: 90) points out, ‘it is ironic . . . that account-
ing researchers were awakening to the scientific
method of inquiry just as events in philosophy of
science were raising doubts about the validity of any
exclusive approach to inquiry.’
One important difference between the American
and UK scene is the place of radical accounting
research. In the USA, strongly positivist variants of
empiricism continue to hold an overwhelmingly
dominant position (Reiter, 1998). While a ‘strongly
positivist’ version of neo-empiricism remains the
‘predominant’ research tradition in the UK (Beattie,
2002: 112), the British academy has found substan-
tial space for interpretive and critical approaches
(Beattie, 2002: 212). The development of the
radical programme can be linked to that of positiv-
ism in a number of ways. The positivist project pre-
dated radical accounting research and, by redefining
the objects of inquiry of accounting research,
opened up the ground for other perspectives
drawn from social science and sanctioned the
move away from focusing on financial reporting
systems as systems. Further, positivism provided a
position against which to react (Roslender and
Dillard, 2003: 327): many expositions of radical
developments in accounting thought, including
possibly the most frequently cited, Chua’s 1986
paper in the Accounting Review, are set out as a
series of contrasts with what she calls the ‘main-
stream’ (Chua, 1986: 611) perspective, and Merino
(1998: 604) says firmly: ‘I view the rejection of
modernist epistemology, modelled on 17th century
Newtonian physics and its rule boundmethodology,
as the unifying factor in accounting critical [sic]
research’.
Though optimism about the potential for a priori
theorising (in effect, classical accounting research)
survived in the UK into the late 1970s (Whittington,
1981a), the embrace of social science turned out to
be as seductive in the UK as in the USA. Yet, as
demonstrated in Section 4, epistemological pos-
itions to underpin classicism remained available
and, as shown in Section 3, by the early 1980s, there
was plentiful evidence that neo-empiricism was not
yielding the abundance of results that had been
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hoped for. Rather, the turn to mainstream social
science represented the seeking out of social
scientific methodology for its own sake.
As mentioned at the end of Section 2, both
Cushing (1989) and Mouck (1993) examine the
move to neo-empiricism in the USA using a
Kuhnian framework. Cushing considers that the
US crisis in financial accounting research in the
1970s parallels, not a Kuhnian paradigm shift, but a
different effect noted by Kuhn, namely the desertion
of science by scholars unable to tolerate crisis:
‘contemporary academic accountants . . . have in a
fundamental sense deserted accounting’ (p. 29).
Beattie and Davie (2006) report Cushing’s broad
argument correctly but immediately follow this by
stating that, ‘thus, the domain of the accounting
discipline widened and new theory groups formed’
(p. 4; emphasis added). Widening of theory is a
form of progressiveness but is hardly consistent
with Cushing’s own view: ‘the discipline’s leading
scholars no longer display a paramount interest in
the fundamental issues that distinguish accounting
from other fields. This suggests that accounting’s
present crisis is not only severe, but possibly fatal to
accounting as a viable branch of knowledge’
(Cushing, 1989: 31). Again, Beattie and Davie
suggest that Mouck’s (1993) conclusion was that
the transition was ‘not a revolution . . . but rather a
normal science expansion of the economics para-
digm’ (pp. 4–5). They fail to point out that Mouck
regarded this expansion as an incursion by eco-
nomics into space formerly occupied by the, now-
failing, classical research programme, which he
actually argued to be in a pre-paradigmatic state.
6. The sociology of the turn to mainstream
social science
A growing literature on the sociology of accounting
research practice in the USA24 is directed at
explaining the emergence and continuing domin-
ance of neo-empiricism, a dominance seen, at least
implicitly, as achieved against the claims of radical
research rather than the classical programme. This
paper begins the search for a more complex
sociological model of the British financial account-
ing academy that can account for the widespread
adoption of neo-empiricism despite its fruitfulness
having already come under question from its own
practitioners in the USA; its continuing vitality in
the face of limited fruitfulness; the emergence of a
substantial community of radical researchers and
their absorption into the mainstream, again in the
face of limited fruitfulness; and the demise of
classical accounting research despite the evidently
pluralistic nature of the British academy. Following
Beattie (2005), potential influences will be classi-
fied as cognitive, external social, and internal social
factors.
6.1. Cognitive factors
According to Whitley (1988: 641), the particularly
strong ‘belief in scientific knowledge as a crucial
resource in maintaining and improving the social
order’ manifest in the USA, combined with the
achievements of operational research and econom-
ics, encouraged an expansion in formal, mathema-
ticised, hypothetico-deductive methods applied to
managing organisations and these came to dominate
the work of leading business schools from the 1950s
onwards. Cognitively, the principal influence which
enabled this general ‘scientification’ (Whitley,
1988: 642) to be extended to financial accounting
research was accountancy’s traditional use of
marginalist economics to provide its theorisation,
which made the adoption of economic theory
generally difficult to resist. Other attractions in the
US context were that neo-empiricism is compatible
with a strongly capitalistic worldview (Reiter, 1998:
153–154) and utilises a ‘ready made’, pre-justified,
methodology imported from finance, particularly
comforting for an intellectually immature discipline
(Gaffikin, 1988: 27) and especially one suffering
from ‘a professional inferiority complex’
(Mattessich, 1995: 162; see also Hopwood, 2007:
1366).
Key features of neo-empiricism are the elegance
of its methods, which is conceded even by its critics
(Reiter, 1998: 152–153), and how little attention it
gives to its epistemological stance and overarching
theorisation. As Sterling (1990) points out, although
Watts and Zimmerman’s (1986) landmark expos-
ition of positive accounting theory actually begins
by stating, ‘this book is about accounting theory’
(p. 1), in fact only the first brief chapter (14 pages
out of 362) is devoted to considering theory as such.
Though demanding in the quantitative skills it
requires, neo-empiricism is only lightly burdened
with theoretical baggage, enabling those with the
requisite technical skills to get rapidly down to
work.
From a UK perspective, the importance of the
rapid expansion of neo-empiricism in the USA is
that it provided an attractive source of research
questions and methods, ready made and now pre-
justified twice over: Peasnell’s 1981 survey
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described efficient markets research as ‘intellectu-
ally impressive’ twice within the same paragraph
(1981: 107 and 108), giving reasons which included
its ‘impressive economic-statistical methodology
. . . the like of which is not to be found elsewhere in
accounting’ (1981: 108). Although the technical
skills required by neo-empirical research are
demanding, the nature of the programme offers
extensive scope for using very similar research
designs on new data (Daley, 1994: 44). This point is
often made as a criticism but it actually offers
significant opportunities for those with some quan-
titative skills but limited abilities and expertise in
research design, especially given the broad similar-
ity between UK and US financial systems.
Neo-empiricism was slow to get off the ground in
the UK, partly, no doubt, because of the UK
accounting academy’s relative shortage of quanti-
tative skills (Peasnell, 1981: 119–120). The delay
meant that the programme began growing signifi-
cantly only after its epistemological and methodo-
logical weaknesses had begun to be exposed –
Peasnell’s 1981 survey lists five ‘limitations’ (1981:
108–109). This must have helped in opening up the
field to other theoretical perspectives. Because
accounting departments in the UK are generally
located in social science faculties rather than ‘stand
alone’ business schools, radical ideas were not
anathematised in the UK as in the USA. For entrants
with a traditional background, radical theorising
may have the appeal of exoticism, while those
motivated to enter academic life by discomfort with
practice may find its politics attractive. Each school
within social theory offers a ready made, pre-
justified approach for importation into financial
accounting research. Each is, in its own terms,
elegant and rigorous. As with neo-empiricism, a
form of replication study can be undertaken,
demonstrating that accountancy, like all other
instruments of hegemony, works to exploit the
subaltern classes, feed the will to power/truth, create
textual meaning from nothingness, promote sur-
veillance, discipline and punishment, and so on. As
we have seen (Section 3.2), much radical account-
ing research appears to take this form.
6.2. External social factors
Beattie (2002) identifies a number of interactions
between accounting practice and the theorisation of
the classical programme but is able to draw only
much more tenuous links between theory and
practice since the social scientific turn. The only
relevant developments in practice identified since
the 1970s are cross-border harmonisation, the
increasing importance of intangible assets and
greater concern with earnings management.
Although these have focused attention on particular
topics, Beattie does not suggest any intellectual
advances resulting from them. Indeed, a major
factor in explaining the character of the contem-
porary accounting academy in the UK is the almost
total lack of any significant engagement between
the accountancy profession and the scholarly com-
munity at the level of research (Arnold, 1989;
Baxter, 1988; Dewing and Russell, 1998;
Hopwood, 2007; Power, 2004; Whittington, 1986;
Zeff, 1996).
Practitioners take little notice of post-classical
research because it is perceived as having little
relevance to their interests (Roslender and Dillard,
2003: 343; Whitley, 1988: 642–643).25 Some
commentators have argued that politically sophis-
ticated practitioners are particularly comfortable
about academic accountants pursuing post-classical
research precisely because it does not present
policy-relevant findings to those, such as regulators,
who might be inclined to use them. Neo-empiricism
deals with ‘imaginary worlds of economic equili-
bria where information is true and costless and
everyone acts ‘‘rationally’’’ and, consequently,
‘current practices and conventions are not . . .
threatened by this sort of research because it does
not deal with them’ (Whitley, 1988: 642–643; see
also Power, 2004: 377; Tinker, 1985: 205). Radical
attacks on practice are regarded as too arcane to
merit attention (Roslender and Dillard, 2003: 343).
At the same time the weight of mathematicisation
(in the case of neo-empiricism, Whitley, 1988: 641)
or social theorisation (in the case of the radical
programme) preserves post-classical work from
informed criticism by the profession.
Even if uninterested in their results, practitioners
might benignly aid academics by providing access
to the sites on which accounting practice takes place
but the level of such access is actually minimal, for
sound business reasons (Bricker and Previts, 1990:
11–12; Howieson, 1996: 33; Kinney, 1989: 120–
21). The production of financial statements is
almost inevitably highly sensitive in any location
about which there would be interesting things to be
discovered and any data other than that actually
produced (for example, using alternative account-
ing policies or measurement methods) would be
expensive to prepare and also potentially highly
sensitive (Peat Marwick Mitchell & Co., 1982: 89–
90; Rutherford, 2007: 98). Poor access increases the
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attractiveness of programmes which do not require
co-operation from practitioners.
6.3. Internal social factors
In 1986–1987, 66% of accounting staff in the older
universities were professionally qualified (Wallace,
1997: 232–233) but between 1998 and 2003 only
30% of recruits to pre-1992 institutions held a
CCAB qualification (Duff and Monk, 2006: 203).
This decline in staff with a professional back-
ground, largely a reflection of increasing salary
differentials between practice and academia (Brinn
et al., 2001: 351; Wallace, 1997: 233) is linked by
Otley (2002: 398) to a ‘dearth of policy- or
business-oriented work’ in accounting (see also
Beattie, 2005: 94). It reduces the number of
researchers with advanced expertise in accounting
techniques, familiarity with practical contexts,
access to the tacit knowledge-base of accounting
practice, credibility with practitioners as research
subjects, and an interest in the problems which
provide the material for classical accounting
research.
A deterioration in research time, combined with
pressures to increase output in quantitative terms
(Gray et al., 2002; Humphrey et al., 1995; Parker
and Guthrie, 2005; Puxty et al., 1994), has encour-
aged researchers to focus on the efficiency and
effectiveness of research methodologies in deliver-
ing research products, primarily articles in learned
journals. The methodologies of post-classical pro-
grammes offer a number of advantages. Availability
of extensive, publicly accessible, data in machine-
readable form, the potential for replication studies
with limited methodological contribution, and the
growth in cheap computational capacity, have
greatly facilitated the production of neo-empirical
articles (Whittington, 1981b: 131, 1986: 131) and
made this form of research ‘low risk’ in that ‘validity
of research outcomes . . . becomes a technical
matter rather than a conceptual or theoretical one’
(Whitley, 1988: 641–642). The radical programme
can also enable articles to be produced reasonably
speedily and with relatively low risk, for example
by remaining within a narrow theoretical model
with which the researcher is familiar for multiple
projects, generating papers demonstrating that any
particular theoretical position applies to account-
ancy, comparing details of two theoretical positions,
and so on (Humphrey, 2001: 92–94; Wallace, 1997:
243). Neo-empirical research does not typically
require access to unpublished data and this is also
true of radical research conducted at the theoretical
level or employing publicly available material as
case studies. All in all, post-classical accounting
research methods are efficient and reliable at
producing academic outputs compared to the trad-
itional approach to research design in the classical
programme, which is to start with a problem and
search out methods to solve it (Zeff, 1989: 170).
Academic accounting in the UK has traditionally
been located in social science faculties. The impact
of this, primarily through the career and reward
structures of institutions, combined, perhaps, with a
feeling of inferiority in the face of the better
established disciplines of mainstream social science
(Wallace, 1997: 239), seems likely to be significant.
Candidates for promotion generally have to com-
pete with others, and will be judged by senior staff,
from across the faculty. Research papers which
resemble those of mainstream social science are
likely to carry more weight (Wallace, 1997: 239).
Once classical research comes to be perceived as
inferior, social control effects snowball. Editors
seeking to improve the reputation of their journals
may discourage acceptance of articles within the
classical programme, if only at the margin of
acceptability. Departments seeking to improve
reputations and research assessment scores will
prefer early career recruits who have the research
training to begin immediately to publish in high
quality journals – which is easier if undertaking
post-classical work (Brinn et al., 2001: 350–351;
Weetman, 1993) – and applicants with established
careers who have published in such journals. Vice-
chancellors seeking ‘research stars’will look only at
post-classical researchers.
7. Conclusion and implications
In the UK, the classical financial accounting
research programme remained in good health into
the 1980s, well after it had been eradicated in the
USA. But American developments robbed the UK’s
classical programme of a powerful source of
intellectual nourishment while providing an alter-
native approach of great attractiveness. British
pluralism enabled both neo-empiricism and radical
research to flourish but the classical programme
itself has died out, as a consequence, I argue, of
sociological features of the academy. I have not set
out to deny the legitimacy of post-classical research
which has, indeed, had some successes, for
example, in influencing the way the relationship
between accounting numbers and share prices is
characterised (neo-empiricism) and the develop-
ment of social responsibility accounting (radical-
ism). I seek merely to demonstrate that, neither by
its fruitfulness in generating innovative and relevant
findings nor by incontestable epistemological
superiority, does post-classical research justify the
CCH - ABR Data Standards Ltd, Frome, Somerset – 13/5/2010 04 ABR Rutherford.3d Page 165 of 172
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elimination of the classical programme: contem-
porary research programmes mark a turn to main-
stream social science rather than a progressive
development. This turn took place, not directly in
response to the call for empirical research by Nelson
and others, but only as such of the initial responses
to this call as continued to address the traditional
objects of inquiry of financial accounting research
(namely accounting systems as systems), and in
particular, the predictive ability project, came to be
abandoned. In the face of the difficulties which
researchers using social scientific methods encoun-
tered in addressing the traditional objects of inquiry
of financial accounting research, the accounting
academy retained the methods and rejected the
objects of inquiry.
The light cast on the turn to social science by this
paper suggests that the financial accounting
research community may have been premature in
its abandonment of classicism – that there may be
life yet in the programme and in the activity directed
at the traditional objects of inquiry of accounting
research that it permits. It might be objected that the
classical programme in its heyday was no more
fruitful than others have been since. Certainly the
profession’s deep suspicion of any intellectual
approach to its discipline (Stamp and Marley,
1970: 113–114; Wallace, 1997: 233–235) places a
limit on its absorption of research outputs.
However, significant contributions have been
made to accounting practice by the classical
programme.
Among the academic advances with a significant
impact on accounting practice identified by Baxter,
in his monograph reflecting on the relationship
between academic research and practical needs, was
the development of current cost accounting (Baxter,
1988: 4). During the 1970s and 1980s, while the UK
profession struggled to adapt traditional financial
reporting to cope with substantial levels of inflation,
there was a significant demand both for the outputs
of previous classical research in the area and for
further research conducted by classical methods.
The models employed in the development of
practical solutions to accounting under inflation
were essentially the products of academic theorists
working within the classical programme (Tweedie
and Whittington, 1984: especially chapters 2–3).
Additional developmental activity included both
further a priori theorising responding to lacunae in
the basic models, for example on the issue of
physical versus monetary capital maintenance (see,
for example, Tweedie and Whittington, 1985) and
empirical work – largely carried out without heavy
mathematicisation – to investigate the usefulness of
current cost accounting (see, for example, Carsberg
and Page, 1984). These contributions became
redundant as a result of ‘the end of the current
cost revolution’ in the late 1980s (Tweedie and
Whittington, 1997) but they demonstrate the cap-
acity of classical work to contribute to accounting
practice.
A second contribution came about as a result of
the increasing importance in accounting standard-
isation of an approach based on a conceptual
framework, dating, in the UK, from 1988 onwards
(Rutherford, 2007: 261–264). The UK’s framework
is strongly derived from the original, US, project
(Rutherford, 2000: 5), which, itself, drew heavily on
classical theorising, as any account of the evolution
of the project makes clear (Gore, 1992; Solomons,
1986; Storey and Storey, 1998). The move to a more
conceptually rigorous approach to standardisation
might have been expected to generate significant
demand for classical accounting research and,
indeed, UK standard-setters have called for research
inputs from the academic community, though they
generally complain that few are received
(Rutherford, 2007: 113–114; Wallace, 1997: 245–
246; Whittington, 1995). This is hardly surprising
since, ironically, demand grew significant only as
the classical programme was rapidly dying.
It has long been accepted that there is a schism in
the USA between accounting practice and academic
accounting research (Bricker and Previts, 1990);
some commentators identify a similar schism in the
UK (Baxter, 1988; Dewing and Russell, 1998;
Wallace, 1997). Though by nomeans the only cause
of this schism, the turn to mainstream social science
is a major contributory factor.26 The schism appears
unique to anglophone countries – it is apparent in
Australia (Howieson, 1996) but not in Germany
(Power, 2004: 382) – and to accountancy. Adopting
social scientific methods in some of its programmes
has not resulted in the legal academy abandoning
doctrinal legal studies and sociology departments
embracing social theory nonetheless conduct
research considered useful by social policy analysts.
Reopening space for classical research may help
to mend the schism and enable the academy to make
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a contribution to accounting practice once again,
providing an intellectually rewarding pathway for
researchers keen to engage with accounting systems
as technical systems. As suggested above, the
increasing importance of conceptually-based
accounting standardisation, especially combined
with the growing complexity of substantive topics,
offers opportunities for classical research; indeed
the discussion documents of standard-setters grow
increasingly to resemble the normative theorising
previously produced within the academic commu-
nity (see, for example, IASB, 2005). Current
economic developments suggest that recent price
stability may be coming to an end, perhaps raising
again demand for classical research in price change
accounting.
In making a contribution to practice, academics
will bring their traditional strengths of theoretical
sophistication, multidisciplinarity, rigour, disinter-
estedness and ability to take the long view, strengths
which give them a comparative advantage over
practitioners in theorisation and will, it is to be
hoped, enable them to improve the overall social
functioning of accountancy. Practitioners’ trad-
itional suspicion of intellectualism is reflected in
some quarters in attitudes to conceptually-based
standardisation but the approach seems fairly well
embedded and may help to encourage at least
leaders of the profession to be more open to
theoretical debate.
Among the developments which a resurgence in
the classical programme could usefully embrace are
further exploration of its underlying epistemologi-
cal position;27 the (re)introduction of the method-
ology of classical research into the research training
of new entrants to academia; and the establishment
of one or more journals devoted to classical
research. Research training might be provided, at
least initially, by means of the coverage of account-
ing theory and the history of accounting thought and
practice that, as Zeff (1989: 170) points out, was the
traditional route to an appreciation of classical
methods but has been squeezed out of the curricu-
lum by the demand for training in current practice at
the undergraduate level and social science research
methods at the postgraduate level. Perhaps funding
for a journal devoted to classical accounting
research might be available from a professional
body or large professional firm.
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